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Abstract
This paper aims to analyze the interactions between home country governments and Developing Country
Multinational Companies (DMNCs). Drawing on evidence from the Brazilian political environment and
Brazilian multinationals we investigate the mechanisms governments use to influence the internationalization
process of domestic companies and firms’ political strategic responses to shape the political institutional
environment in which they operate. We argue that foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from developing
economies need to be explored given specific country level contextual factors, such as high levels of government
involvement. Our main findings support this idea and indicate that home country governments use a series of
formal and informal mechanisms in order to drive the international expansion of DMNCs in both the entry and
consolidation phases. Moreover, DMNCs political behavior in the home country political environment accounts
for an important part of their strategy to develop political resources and obtain above average returns from
governmental benefits.
Key words: competitive advantage; interactions between companies and governments; developing country
multinational companies.
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Introduction

This paper aims to analyze the interactions between home country governments and Developing
Country Multinational Companies (DMNCs). Building on evidence from the Brazilian political
environment and Brazilian multinationals, we uncover the mechanisms of government influence in the
internationalization process of domestic companies and firms’ political strategic responses to shape
public policy process. The research seeks to contribute to a growing body of studies oriented towards
understanding DMNCs’ international insertion. DMNCs have been shown to have different strategic
choices that can be explained by their context, country of origin, industry and size (Ramamurti, 2012).
We intent to explore how the political component embedded in international business activity has an
influence in such choices and impacts DMNC entrance in new markets, a subject that has been only
marginally discussed by International Business (IB).
Recent interest in understanding the internationalization of DMNCs was motivated by a
systemic change in global FDI flows. In 2010, developing and transition economies share of global
FDI outflows increased to 28%, up from 15% in 2007 (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development [UNCTAD], 2011), while during the 1980’s DMNCs accounted only for shares between
3 to 9.6 % of world outward FDI. Furthermore, DMNCs have special particularities that influence
their international strategies. They are generally state-owned or recently privatized companies
organized in business groups, which together accounted for a third of the emerging world’s foreign
direct investment in the period of 2003-10, according to data from UNCTAD (2012); they have
adopted distinctive approaches to internationalization (Goldstein, Bonaglia, & Mathews, 2006); and
developed a symbiotic relationship with governments (Schneider & Soskice, 2009). Thus, FDI
outflows from developing countries should be understood considering contextual factors such as high
levels of government involvement, industry structures, ownership patterns, and business law
enforcement (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).
Despite the fact that the political environment is pointed out as a constrainer or supporter of
DMNCs strategies, only anecdotal information exists about how, and through which mechanisms, the
interaction between DMNCs and governments occurs. This paper fills this gap by providing an indepth analysis about the mechanisms of interaction between multinationals and home country
governments based on evidence from Brazil, a democracy with a history of both developmental and
liberal governments. First, it investigates the influence of the Brazilian government as a driver of the
international expansion of domestic firms in both entry and consolidation phases in the foreign market.
Second, our research focuses on the political component of multinational corporations’ (MNCs)
strategies, incorporating firms as actors not only constrained by the political institutional environment,
but also able to influence policy outcomes. Most IB studies take institutions for granted or only as
constraint factors, focusing on how MNCs can mitigate political risk when host countries impose
fiscal and regulatory reforms or restrictions to finance mechanisms (Henisz, 2000; Holburn & Zelner,
2010). In fact, in developing countries, political activity is an alternative corporate strategy to
overcome lack of market institutional support. While Corporate Political Activity (CPA) and IB
streams together provide a broad perspective of international business-government interactions, there
is a great need for a better integration of the two literatures (Blumentritt & Night, 2002). Studies about
MNE-government relations tend to stand by themselves, without attempting to integrate explicitly into
MNC theory (Boddewyn, 1988).
To examine the mechanisms of DMNCs-government interaction we first present a brief review
about the role assigned to home country governments on IB research and the literature about corporate
political strategy. We also point to the relevance of industrial and foreign trade policies in shaping the
importance that political connections have gained in the case of DMNCs. We then describe our
research methodology, our study sample and our main findings, proposing constructs to classify
DMNC–home country government mechanisms of interaction. Finally, we present our conclusion and
discuss evidence that suggest an association between DMNCs political behavior and above average
benefits from home country government.
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DMNCs and the Role of the Home Country Government

Governments meaningfully affect firms’ performance, operations and governance, and the
market environment in which they compete (Marcus, Kaufman, & Beam, 1987) because of the way
they distribute the burdens and benefits among firms. As Boddewyn (1988) stressed, non-market
actors, such as governments, support market transactions through power and other noneconomic
sanctions and, therefore, need to be accounted for in the IB perspective. Governments can subsidize
financial resources, create and enforce jurisdiction on hostile acquisitions, release public tenders and
own effective controlling interest in corporate entities, as in state-owned companies and sovereign
funds, facilitate MNCs’ market access, dialogue with foreign governments and international
organizations, and even impose barriers to the transfer of factors of production and ownership control.
They are aware that through MNCs they develop the ability to connect the local economy to the
outside world (Luo, 2004) and can implement public policies, such as industrial and foreign policy.
In many emerging economies, globalization and an exogenous increase in the portion of the
economy that was exposed to international competition have induced changes in economic preferences
and market and political power reorganization. Although exogenous forces have spread market
reforms and an increase in internationalization levels in many countries, policy outcomes can only be
explained at a country specific level. This is because differences in actor’s preferences are not directly
reflected as changes in domestic policies; they are mediated by institutions (Garret & Lange, 1995).
Since it is our interest in this paper to understand domestic policies that support firm
internationalization, it is necessary to look at both the political conflict shaped by the preferences of
different actors, weighted by their market power and their propensity for collective action and the role
of extant political and macroeconomic institutions of a country.
Garret and Lange (1995) support that governments’ responsiveness to changes in domestic
preferences will vary significantly according to institutional arrangements, considering regime type
(how easy is to challenge the policies of the incumbent government), the level of government
dependence on the core group that support the status quo, the number of veto points in the political
system (inversely correlated) and the level to which authority over policy rests in the hands of
independent bureaucratic agencies.
One of the most interesting features that characterized the DMNC internationalization process is
the involvement of developing country governments that support international activities of firms from
their country (Sargent & Ghaddar, 2001). This involvement responds to historical paths that are not
shared by their developed country counterparts. As presented by Gammeltoft, Pradhan, and Goldstein
(2010) in the special issue of the Journal of International Management, in emerging economies.
Central and local governments play a larger and more active role in the economy, and firms tend
to be more attuned to government priorities and preferences. Government support also provides
emerging economy firms with privileged access to certain inputs, preferential financing,
subsidies and other support (p. 1).
For instance, researchers divide the expansion of emerging multinationals into three different
periods. In the first wave of internationalization, governments from emerging countries relied on
import-substitution policies (Lall, 1983) and consequently stimulated production directed at the
domestic market. The second wave, dominated by Asian firms, was defined by export-oriented
industrialization, which targeted the creation of large players that could seek previously unavailable
assets and markets, allowing local firms to build their international competitiveness (Rasiah,
Gammeltoft, & Jiang, 2010). This second wave led to the growth of many of the central actors of the
third wave of Internationalization, (Rasiah et al., 2010), which brought more market power (especially
for firms trading in natural resources).
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Industrial and trade policies were key drivers for the increase in OFDI coming from these
nations (Rasiah et al., 2010). Governments had a special interest in capturing the benefits that can
result from OFDI and in regulating the way in which these policies affected their internal positioning.
This resulted in a number of protectionist policies in Asia and Latin America, that for the latter
represented the surge of organized sectors of production safeguarded by tariff walls (Etzkowitz &
Brisolla, 1999).
In our view, the case of Brazil is representative of many emerging economies as it shares many
of the steps that came into defining a policy agenda. Specifically Brazil places a lot of importance in
its industrial policies as part of its effort to become a player in the international arena (1 & 5). The
government has had an important involvement in the creation of policies that support sectors deemed
strategic, such as the automotive and petrochemical industries (Shapiro, 1994) and currently holds an
ownership position in many of the most internationalized DMNCs in the country (6).
In reality, policy changes come as part of an effort to adapt emerging economies’ procedures
and mechanisms of interaction with companies against those from developed countries, since DMNCs
have unique characteristics and behaviors (Sargent & Ghaddar, 2001). DMNCs develop different
competences in comparison to traditional MNCs, such as cost advantages and political competences,
due to contextual characteristics like their history in unstable political and economic environments and
less capital-intensive markets. Emerging economies suffered from a remarkable failure to build up
firm-specific advantages to drive FDI and make it profitable (Murtha & Lenway, 1994). Local
governments tend to engage and even coordinate regulatory and financing activities in order to
compensate for the late mover position of DMNCs (Rasiah et al., 2010).
Current literature covers only a few issues regarding home country government influence on
DMNC internationalization. For example, DMNCs’ experience in turbulent political environments can
have a positive effect on the development of political capabilities; i.e., organizational capabilities for
assessing policy risk and managing the policy-making process, which can be transferred to operations
in similar institutional environments and guarantee DMNCs a competitive advantage in comparison to
MNCs from developed countries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010). The literature also suggests that FDI can
be an escape response to home country factors such as high tax rates (Caves, 1996) and lack of
institutional alignment with firm’s needs (Witt & Lewin, 2007).

Multinational political activity
The way in which governments and firms interact is one of the key components of MNC
internationalization theories (Dunning, 1988). Since companies depend on governments to realize their
profits, it is important that they be politically underwritten in a way that gives them a high degree of
representation (Schneider & Soskice, 2009). Through political activity, companies seek to protect
themselves from government opportunism (Henisz & Williamson, 1999), and to gain legitimacy and
political rents resulting from government action as a regulator and factor of production.
The growing entanglement of the public and private sectors has encouraged many corporations
to reassess their existing methods for interacting with the government (Marcus et al., 1987). Hillman
and Hitt (1999) developed a framework to account for businesses’ political strategic formulation. They
argue that firms can employ information, financial incentives and constituency building strategies and
this decision depends on the issue, its frequency and also on the political environment of the country in
which the firm operates (Blumentritt & Night, 2002). There are different mechanisms available,
including lobbying, public and government relations, alliances with other firms and bribery (Hillman
& Hitt, 1999), which can be used individually or combined in order to exploit political rents and to
raise the transaction costs for competing firms.
One of the key decisions companies must make regarding their non-market strategies is related
to collective versus individual action. Although individual undertaking may lead to superior returns in
comparison to industry competitors, the initial decision of establishing a public affairs office and
developing public affairs capability is costly and difficult to revoke (Blumentritt, 2003). According to
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transaction cost theory, the coordination in the nonmarket environment will vary according to the
frequency of dependencies and the types of human assets (specific/ nonspecific) (Ring & Van de Ven,
1992). When firm and industry interests are congruent, investments in nonspecific human assets at the
trade association level are likely to occur. However, interests within industries are often seriously
divided and therefore groups cannot engage in frequent and effective collective action, forcing a firm
to invest in specific human assets in order to develop political expertise or acquire it from a consulting
firm. It is quite plausible that a single firm facing multiple issues of relevant government dependence
will pursue each of these strategies simultaneously (Marcus et al., 1987).

Research Methodology

We conducted a qualitative analysis in order to uncover the mechanisms of interaction between
governments and DMNCs and their effect on a firm’s international insertion. As a process data
analysis, it provides means to conceptualize events and detect patterns among them (Langley, 1999),
which can be later categorized and inspire propositions for future research. We chose Brazil, given that
most of the country’s MNCs are leading companies in their sector (Fleury & Fleury, 2009), such as the
animal protein industry. The case serves to describe the internationalization of DMNCs as it captures
the behavior of companies that have followed similar internationalization paths to those signaled in the
literature as traditional of emerging multinationals, such as being late movers and focusing on
acquisition (Fleury & Fleury, 2011).
Our research was built upon primary information gathered around two Brazilian MNCs, one a
public investment agency and one a business association. We also collected secondary data, such as
financial and industrial reports, economic indicators and case studies published from 1994 to 2011.
Due to the sensitivity of political issues, the secondary data was an important source for understanding
the phenomena studied and for making triangulations.
The interviews were conducted from July to October 2011 and addressed not only the
companies’ own experiences but also changes in industry and competition patterns. We selected two
Brazilian MNCs from the animal protein sector listed in the Valor Multinational/Sobeet ranking for
most internationalized companies in Brazil. This ranking, published by one of Brazil’s most respected
business magazines, measures companies’ internationalization indices through the number of jobs,
assets and revenue aboard. In 2010, firm 1 had net revenue around US$27.5 billion and a large public
shareholder participation owned by a public bank. Firm 2 had net revenue of approximately US$12.5
billion and is characterized by a good degree of maturity in operational performance, as well as stock
ownership by state-owned pension funds.
We interviewed directors, managers and analysts of the areas related to internationalization,
institutional and investor relations. We used secondary information to formulate questions directly
related to issues of internationalization, investments and public policies. In each interview, at least two
researchers were present to take field notes. We recorded the interviews when allowed. Afterwards, we
complemented our secondary data with information mentioned by our informants, such as foreign
investments, political connections and financial loans.
In order to allow a holistic view of the process we interviewed representatives from an industry
federation and an investment promotion agency. Organization 3 is a private industry federation whose
mission is to represent industrial interests in society, including in public spheres, by giving assistance
on issues like advocacy, market intelligence, customs clearance and trade promotion. Organization 4 is
a state investment promotion agency that aims to facilitate dialogue between business and foreign
governments to attract foreign direct investment. We complemented interviews with data about public
development banks loans, public agency mandates and industrial policy programs.
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The data was collectively analyzed in group sessions in order to increase internal validity. These
analysis sessions took place during the period from May 18 until November 24, 2011. The
examination was conducted using simple categorical qualitative analysis through an inductive method.
The construction of the final conceptual framework was devised as a functional model with data and
extant literature integration. In order to further validate our model, we conducted a new data
collection, essentially from secondary sources, in order to strengthen, refute and refine the framework
developed and avoid mis-fitting data.
As not all relevant information collected from interviewees and secondary sources could be
included in our discussion, we have provided an additional annex (Annex A) at the end of this paper,
in order to add more evidence on the mechanisms of political influence identified in the research.

Discussion and Findings

This section is divided in two subsections. The first section considers the influence of the
Brazilian government in the internationalization process of Brazilian MNCs and describes ways of
government’s influence considering the institutional channels of dialogue between firms and
governments and their level of formality. The second section identifies political strategies used by
Brazilian MNCs in their home country environment.

Home country government’s influence on Brazilian MNCs
Research connecting business and politics recognizes the role of the government as a regulator
and factor of production (Boddewyn & Brewer 1994). They have the ability to alter firms’ size, market
and cost structure and affect the demand for products and services (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In order to
do this, governments use many instruments, including but not limited to antitrust legislations, taxation,
credit lines and direct purchase.
The Brazilian government’s agenda shows a growing interest in national MNCs’ activities.
Public policies directed to enhance Brazilian companies’ competitiveness and international expansion
have been developed since the 1990’s. Although government’s role has changed in comparison to
previous periods that were characterized by import-substitution industrialization policies, the
government has kept its interventionist bent and maintains for itself the role of selecting and
promoting strategic sectors, as indicated in the following excerpt from The Economist, (2010),
In some cases the state actively promotes industrial concentration, to help firms gain the scale to
compete abroad. In the 1990s a privatizing government got around the scarcity of capital and
know-how by coaxing state-owned pension funds to co-operate with private companies, and
pushed public banks into giving them subsidized loans. Today Brazil’s firms are stronger and its
capital markets deeper. But the government continues to intervene.
Government’s role is more evident in initial phases of the internationalization process,
specifically during the entry phase in new markets. Even before the international expansion of
Brazilian MNCs, the Brazilian government predisposed industry concentration in strategic sectors in
order to build national champions able to compete with incumbent MNCs in the international market.
With the rapid international expansion of Brazilian MNCs, government involvement during both the
entry and expansion phases has increased.
As noticed in our interviews, “governments are not unique and cohesive organizations; they
have a series of internal disputes” (Organization 3, field note). This means that public policies can
have mixed effects for Brazilian MNCs. But since internationalization promotion has reached
consensus in the Brazilian public agenda, the government has recently created public and capital
agencies that act as direct channels of interaction with MNCs and have the role to: (a) assign political
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meaning to and consolidate unique visions for MNC demands before any of their negotiations with
other governmental actors, where the dispute for public policies and public funds is more intense; and
(b) make sure MNCs interests are represented in the three branches of government.
Data analysis indicated that governments use a series of formal and informal reinforcement
mechanisms to interact with MNCs, which were categorized as shown in Table 1. It also presents the
constructs that we studied as a way of showing the cognitive process used to interpret and explain our
main findings. Furthermore, it helps to establish linkages between empirical work and conceptual
development.
Table 1
Evidence of Home Country Government Influence on National MNCs
Constructs
Supply of subsidized resources to
internationalization

Evidences
MNCs’ material facts related
Development Bank) loans.

to

BNDE’s

(Brazilian

BNDES’ loans to internationalization projects of Brazilian
companies (BNDES website).
Government’s shareholder participation

Principal shareholders of Brazilian MNE outstanding common
shares (company’s website).

Articulation with foreign governments
and international organizations

“Conflicts involving Odebrecht, in Ecuador, and Petrobras, in
Bolivia, in 2008, demanded that the Brazilian Foreign Ministry
create a new Energy department” (Freitas, 2011).

Favorable
Regulation
and
Legislation

Competition policy

“In the 1990s a privatizing government got around the scarcity
of capital and know-how by coaxing state-owned pension funds
to cooperate with private companies, and pushed public banks
into giving them subsidized loans. Today Brazil’s firms are
stronger and its capital markets deeper. But the government
continues to intervene.” (The Economist, 2010).

Technical Regulation
Thematic or industrial policy BNDES’s policies are aligned with the Brazilian Productive
Development Policy (PDP), which has granted priority to
internationalization projects of selected sectors, such as animal
protein processing (O Estado de São Paulo, 2010a).
Note. Source: elaborated by authors.

Supply of subsidized resources for internationalization
Public institutions are key financial resources for private companies in Brazil. This is likely
explained by the lack of private bank involvement in long-term corporate bonds as well as by the
developing state of the Brazilian stock market.
Through O Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento (BNDES) and its commercial branch,
BNDESPAR, the government increases the mechanisms and modalities of financing
internationalization support, following the guidelines of industrial policy plans, such as the Brazilian
Productive Development Policy (PDP), which has granted priority to internationalization projects of
selected sectors like animal protein processing, as presented in Table 2. Interviewees from Firm 1
pointed out that the proceedings to obtain BNDES’s loans started when the company outlined an
aggressive international expansion plan, stressing that it would not be possible to obtain such
resources on the market with similar conditions. Two Brazilian MNCs operating in the animal protein
industry have occupied the top positions as BNDES’s loan receivers.
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Table 2
BNDES’s Loans to Largest Animal Protein Processing Brazilian MNCs
Year

Client

Project Description

Total (in BRL)

2010

MARFRIG

Support to subscription of convertible debentures.

2,500,000,000

Financing for working capital
2009

2008

200,000,000

JBS S/A

Internationalization of local companies

BRASIL
FOODS

Purchase of common stock, emission of BRF Brasil Foods S.A.,
previously Perdigão S.A., total amount of BRL$1 billion, in the
scope of company’s initial public offering.

750,000,000

Bertin

Financing for working capital, special credit program scope

200,000,000

Bertin

Consolidation of the “Bertin’s internationalization program”
through acquisition of new companies, as well as modernization
and amplification of existing factories and implementation of
new industrial unities.

2.499.929.732

JBS S/A

Investments related to the company internationalization
strategy.

1,109,267,813

MARFRIG

Support to the company’s investment program through
BNDESPAR private stock.

700,000,000

SADIA

Addition of resources for implementation of its domestic
Project, involving the construction of new poultry and swine
slaughterhouses, a new feed factory and swine manufacturer
unity, and the construction of a housing development for
company employees.

329,844,777

Amplification and modernization of industrial unity, in order to
increase slaughter capacity from 50 to 280 thousand poultry per
Day.

156,593,796

PERDIGÃO

3,479,600,000

Note. Source: elaborated by authors based on data from Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento. (n. d.). Consulta às operações
do
BNDES.
Retrieved
from
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_Transparente/Consulta_as_operacoes_do_BND
ES/

BNDES has a specific credit line to finance internationalization of companies with national
control that aims to build new subsidiaries abroad, acquire or expand installed unities and raise its
share participation. Since 2004, BNDES’ operations that aimed at internationalization have increased
significantly, as showed by Table 3.
Table 3
BNDES – OPERATIONS AIMED at Internationalization (in millions of BRL)
Period

Qualifications

Approvals

Spending

2004

3.70

-

-

2005

209.00

197.20

192.20

2006

1,065.00

955.00

970.80

2007

5,091.50

1,630.10

1,223.20
Continues
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Table 3 (continued)
Period

Qualifications

Approvals

Spending

2008

1,842.80

4,309.20

4,237.30

2009

4,484.80

3,588.90

2,265.30

2010

2,510.00

2,589.40

3,849.20

Total

15,206.70

13.83

12,738.00

Note. Source: AINT, DEINT, extracted from Valor Multinacionais Brasileiras. (2011, setembro). Valor Econômico, Ano 4
(4). Retrieved from http://www.revistavalor.com.br/home.aspx?pub=3&edicao=4

Government’s shareholder participation
During the 1990s a series of privatizations and other liberal reforms undertaken in Brazil
changed the ownership structure of domestic companies. Nonetheless, there are still important stateowned Brazilian MNCs, like the giant oil manufacturer, Petrobras, and the biggest power utility in
Latin America, Eletrobras. Another interesting example is Embraer, global leader of regional jets
privatized in 1994, but still under government direct influence since the latter has kept a golden share
right. Governments can also be shareholders of corporate entities, owning stakes of private and
independent corporate entities. BNDESPAR and state-owned pension funds are the main Brazilian
governmental branches of shareholder participation. In the end of 2011, BNDES had direct
shareholder participation in 154 companies, concentrated in the oil and gas, mining, electricity,
foodstuff, pulp and paper and telecommunication sectors (BNDES, 2011). Government decisions acts
as a selective tool, choosing which sectors and firms receive government investment instead of relying
on market mechanisms where companies can count on governments as a lender of last resort.
Although government agencies are contingent to legal requirements and industrial policy
guidelines, in Brazil there is still space to pick the winners. For example, in terms of shareholding,
BNDES’ best practices indicate that the bank has to respect a 30% limit. An exception is allowed for
infant and technology-based companies, where shareholder participation can achieve a 40% share.
However, in JBS’s case, one of the largest Brazilian MNCs in the animal protein sector, BNDES’
stake rose from 17% to more than 30% in 2011. The additional financial support was granted in order
to reduce uncertainties related to JBS Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the USA stock market, which
was not realized. BNDES policy exemplifies a government’s influence on both entry and expansion
phases of internationalization for Brazilian MNCs.

Favorable regulation and legislation
Governments have the opportunity to create, enforce and interpret the rules and norms that
govern firms’ interactions with employees, suppliers, competitors and within the financial, vocational
training and social security systems, among others. While the Legislative body proposes broad
directives through laws, the execute branch enforces them through specific regulations and the
judiciary interprets them and provides the mechanisms for dispute resolution. This means that the
three branches of government may influence MNCs’ coordination.
Studies in the matter have characterized the Brazilian government as a non-facilitator, erratic in
the formulation of rules, weak and hostile for private companies (Pearce, 2001). Some of our
interviewees corroborated this idea, indicating that there are major difficulties related to government
influence on business in Brazil. Most complaints pointed out that bureaucracy, delay in conflict
resolution and the complexity, contestability and lack of clarity of the tributary system represented
serious burdens to local companies. These additional burdens made companies delay their
internationalization process. However, since the 1990s the Brazilian government has been engaged in
compensating internal additional costs to internationalization. It is interesting to note that the learning
experience in the home country has influenced the types of competencies gained by Brazilian MNCs.
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For example, they developed operational excellence and political capabilities to survive in times of
high inflation and political turbulence. Brazilian MNCs are now characterized as flexible and able to
rapidly adapt to external changes.
Brazilian MNCs have a positive perception about governmental technical entities, responsible
for issues like sanitary and external trade regulation. Government–MNC relations on such issues are
mediated through established dialogue channels, making it easier for the firm to register new products
or get permits for new plant factories, for example. In the case of animal protein processing firms,
there is an open dialogue with the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture. This was considered really
important for the researched MNE’s export activities since: “in order to supply international markets,
companies have to comply with international sanitary requirements. Foreign missions can come to
Brazil, or they can delegate the licensing process to Brazilian government” (Firm 2, field note). The
Brazilian government has, according to them, the expertise to deal with such requirements.
In addition, competition policy regulation in Brazil exemplifies how governments can reinforce
their roles in picking the winners in the domestic context and build them to compete in international
markets. The Economist (2010) provides evidence that support this idea:
Antitrust policy has long been weak in Brazil. In the 1990s the country started opening its
economy and privatizing firms in order to increase competition. But a study in 2007 by Edmund
Amann of the University of Manchester and Werner Baer of the University of Illinois found that
15 years later, the market share of the top four companies in most sectors had become even
greater.
Yet, recent changes in Brazil’s Council of Economic Defense (CADE, the national competitive
authority with preventive, repressive and educational duties) may change this scenario. All major
players in the Brazilian animal protein sector have been or are under investigation by the agency. It is
worth noting that CADE can be characterized as an independent agency that can operate on politically
sensitive cases far from government pressure (Drago & Nogueira, 2013).
We can explain the prior experiences by utilizing the framework for the Brazilian Industrial
Policy proposed by Hay (1999). In his work, Hay recognizes two types of policy that the government
can create in order to deal with potential market failures: general industrial policies and sectorial or
vertical policies. General industrial policies are related to creating appropriate models of competition
while vertical policies are set to provide specific sectors with time to adjust to abrupt changes in
market conditions that could affect issues of national interest, like technological development and
employment (Hay, 1999). As shown before, our interviewees corroborated such ideas, pointing to their
specific relationships with vertical entities (Ministry of Agriculture) and the challenges experienced
from competition regulators including the CADE. This observation shows that companies are aware
and respond differently to matters within the industrial policy level.

Articulation with foreign governments and international organizations
MNCs’ access and entrance to new foreign markets often demands interaction between home
and host country governments. The Brazilian MNCs interviewed find that it is quite hard to start a
dialogue with foreign governments without the support of home country institutions. Moreover, as
pointed out by previous research, MNC bargaining power decreases once FDI has been committed
(Henisz & Zelner, 2005). Thus, home country government support seems to also assist Brazilian
MNCs’ international strategies after they are established in a foreign country.
Evidence about the articulation between home and host country governments indicates the
adoption of different and complementary mechanisms, mainly through Ministries and investment
promotion agencies (even if they have a mixed capital ownership structure). One example presented in
our field notes stresses the Brazilian government role in accessing the Japanese swine market.
Brazilian exporters faced sanitary barriers that were often alleged to be technical barriers. To
overcome them, companies looked for government diplomacy assistance. The Brazilian government
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organized bilateral trade missions, generally involving members of the Ministry of External Relations,
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, and Ministry of Agriculture, aiming to
negotiate with their counterparts, exchange information and conduct technical visits.
Besides opening markets abroad, home country governments can communicate with foreign
governments and other host country’s stakeholders in order to solve MNCs conflicts, similar to what
has occurred with Odebrecht, in Ecuador, and Petrobras, in Bolivia, in 2008. Struggles with foreign
stakeholders led to the creation of a new energy department inside the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, capable of dealing with the specificity of these episodes (Freitas, 2011).

Synthesis of government influence mechanisms
According to our research, home country governments adopt a series of mechanisms to
encourage flows and maintenance of outward FDI, either by conceding direct benefits to MNCs in
comparison to other firms or by reducing barriers created by other actors. It is important to notice that
not all forms of influence are converted into MNCs’ benefits, as governments have to respond to
demands from different actors in society with divergent interests.
Governments have formal and informal mechanisms to influence MNCs. Formal mechanisms
are those expressed in norms and rules, codified public policies, public structures and support
apparatus. Examples of formal mechanisms include regulations about limits on ownership, control and
cross-border transfers of production factors by an MNE, or competitive policies released by federal
government, which draws actions involving several governmental entities with the purpose of
stimulating a greater engagement of companies into internationalization.
However, formal mechanisms are often weak and can be replaced by more fluid and
individualistic interactions (Schneider & Soskice, 2009). This is consistent with the evidence found
concerning the Brazilian environment. Informal mechanisms are based on personal networks and
rooted in socially accepted behavioral patterns, such as paternalism and corruption. They are often
used by governments to reach specific goals, for instance to select strategic sectors and actors on the
domestic market in order to create “national champions”.
In addition, evidence collected suggests that a significant part of foreign trade and investment
issues are treated at the federal government level. We have identified entities that supply direct
channels of dialogue with MNCs, such as commerce related ministries, the development public bank
BNDES, and traditional legislative instances. Autonomous agencies, like the Brazilian Trade and
Investment Promotion Agency (Apex-Brasil), BNDESPAR (BNDES’ commercial branch), stateowned companies and pension funds are indirect channels that intermediate government dialogue with
Brazilian MNCs.
Table 4 classifies the ways governments influence national MNCs according to types of
mechanisms (formal and informal) and channels of action used by governments to operationalize their
influence.
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Table 4
Mechanisms of Government’s Influence on National MNCs and Channels of Actions
Action

Mechanisms

Formal

Direct

Indirect

Traditional mechanisms of governmental
influence through the Executive, Legislative
and Judiciary branches.

Mechanisms created by governments that
allow better adaptation for formal dialogue
with the private sector.

Example. Articulation with foreign
governments; supply of resources for
internationalization.

Example: articulation with foreign
governments and government shareholder
participation.

Invisible mechanisms mediated by personal
networks and informal institutions that
Informal penetrate the public sphere.
Ex.: selection of national champions and
corruption.

Invisible mechanisms, implemented through
personal networks with local and foreign
decision-makers
Ex.: articulation with foreign governments
based on personal contacts

Note. Source: Elaborated by authors.

Political strategies
Public policies and the political decision-making process, whether at the district, state or federal
level, affect the relative costs involved in a company’s international expansion. Thus, the political
environment is a key component for MNCs’ strategies. As described below, we identified five political
strategies that Brazilian MNCs use in order to access governmental bodies and represent their interests
in the public sphere.

Financial donations to political parties
In Brazil, financial donations are a political strategy that directly links DCMC’s to individual
politicians or political parties. While candidates and political parties need funds to strengthen their
campaigns and increase their chances for election, companies seek to support candidates with a high
probability of election in order to have their industries well-represented in the public agenda.
Deciding who to support and transfer resources to their campaigns is a strategic decision for
MNCs and can define how government relations will be managed in the years after the election.
Evidence suggests that Brazilian MNCs invest in candidates according to their sectorial agenda rather
than their left-right spectrum. For example, a respondent from Firm 2 stated that “to support the
elections, we don’t look at the party, we look at people linked to the agribusiness sector who advocate
for the sector, if we have a candidate more sensitive to the agribusiness cause, we will support him or
her” (Firm 2, field note). When supported candidates are elected, companies’ ability to influence
thematic public policies in the next mandate increases. It may also help companies to make their
interests represented in the broader industrial policy agenda, which may be reflected in better official
loans conditions, such as those from BNDES.
Most of Brazilian MNCs operating in the animal protein-processing sector have made legal
political donations. According to data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE), JBS has
donated over US$6 million to candidates and political parties from 2006 to 2010, and has been one of
the largest donors to the Workers Party (PT), the current ruling party (Transparência Brasil, 2010). In
2006, 18 supported deputies were elected, the majority from the mid-west region. In 2010, 39
parliamentarians were supported from 15 states.
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Table 5 shows evidence that suggests that Brazilian companies with higher levels of
internationalization are amongst the major donors during Brazilian elections. From the top 10
companies that have donated more money to the winning presidential candidate in 2010 elections, 7
were Brazilian MNCs and 5 of them were listed among the ranking of Valor Multinacionais
Brasileiras (2011), accounting for 28.72% of total donations. Their industries also benefited from
federal government programs such as the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do
Crescimento [PAC]). Inside the PAC, the Family Allowance program increased food intake and sugar
consumption, and the program My Home, My Life boosted the market for real estate developers.
Table 5
Companies’ Donations for Winning Candidate Campaign, Presidential Elections 2010
Rank Donator

Industry

Internationalization
Ranking 2011

Total

Weight

1

JBS S/A

foodstuffs

1

R$ 8,049,120.13

7.19%

2

Camargo Corrêa

conglomarate

18

R$ 7,601,946.79

6.79%

3

Andrade Gutierrez

construction and engineering

6

R$ 4,561,168.07

4.07%

4

Itau Unibanco

finance

35

R$ 4,000,000.00

3.57%

6

Cosan

sugar and ethanol

-

R$ 3,264,365.38

2.91%

7

Construtora OAS

construction and engineering

23

R$ 2,683,040.04

2.40%

9

ARG

construction and engineering

-

R$ 2,000,000.00

1.79%

Total

R$ 32,159,640.41

28.72%

Note. Source: Elaborated by authors based on Transparência Brasil. (2008, outubro). Quem financia quem nas eleições.
Doadores a candidatos [Ás Claras]. Retrieved from http://www.asclaras.org.br/@index.php?ano=2008; Transparência Brasil.
(2010, outubro). Quem financia quem nas eleições. Doadores a candidatos [Ás Claras]. Retrieved from
http://www.asclaras.org.br/@index.php?ano=2010; O Estado de São Paulo. (2010b, dezembro 1). Veja o ranking das 220
empresas que mais doaram para a campanha de Dilma. Política. Retrieved from http://blogs.estadao.com.br/voxpublica/2010/12/01/veja-o-ranking-das-220-empresas-que-mais-contribuiram-para-a-campanha-de-dilma; Toledo, J. R.
(2010). Veja o ranking das 220 empresas que mais doaram para a campanha de Dilma [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blogs.estadao.com.br/vox-publica/2010/12/01/veja-o-ranking-das-220-empresas-que-mais-contribuiram-para-acampanha-de-dilma

Donations can also occur after the election. For example, the President of the National Finance
Committee of the Workers Party received donations from 46 companies for amounts greater than
US$6 million after the campaign. According to the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo (2010a) the
sugarcane industry made the biggest donation to help close the debits of Dilma Rousseff’s campaign
after the election. Cosan, the largest in the industry, made a donation of US$3.5 million, while the
Amaggi Group contributed with US$1 million. The Brazilian sugarcane and alcohol industry is closely
monitoring government negotiations to increase access to US market.

Personal connections
Brazilian business–government history of entanglement had its first milestone in 1930, when
entrepreneurs eventually incorporated into the coalition to support President Getulio Vargas. This pact
was quintessential to lead to the transition from agro-export economy to the urban-industrial society
(Diniz, 2010). Since then industrial entrepreneurs and public bureaucracy have been central actors in
Brazilian political pacts (Bresser-Pereira, 2009).
Personal connections in Brazil are powerful mechanisms to influence government decision
makers. Although economic development and democracy reforms have made the interaction process
more transparent, there is still huge influence from paternalism, nepotism, patronage and other
informal mechanisms. For example, in the agriculture sector, Brazilian MNCs, such as producers of
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fruit juice and alcohol/ sugar cane, historically have close relationships that facilitate access to
authorities. This is an individual informal strategy that is difficult to copy and with potentially high
returns.

Personal service
DCMC’s can establish links to governments when a firm representative serves in a political
capacity. In Brazil, that was a usual strategy during President Lula’s administration (2002 to 2010).
Examples include vice president José Alencar, shareholder of Coteminas, one of the largest textile
groups in the country, Roberto Rodrigues, previous president of ABAG (the Brazilian Agribusiness
Association), as Minister of Agriculture, and Luiz Fernando Furlan, chairman of the board of Sadia,
now BR Foods, a large Brazilian group manufacturer and exporter of food, who was indicated for the
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. An iconic case in Brazil is Jorge Gerdau,
founding of Gerdau group, one of the largest business groups in the Brazilian steel industry, which
operates in over 14 countries and has revenues of more than US$15 billion. Since May of 2011,
Gerdau is the chairman of the Brazilian Chamber of Management Policy, Performance and
Competitiveness, which is responsible for advising government on policies to improve
competitiveness. Over 200 entrepreneurs and executives sponsor the project, including Carlos Alberto
Sicupira, a partner at AB Inbev, Pedro Passos, partner and director of Natura, and David Feffer,
chairman of Suzano Holding (Valor Multinacionais Brasileiras, 2011).
Businessman may also serve in a political capacity by affiliating with political parties and
running for elections. For example, Jose Batista Junior, the founder of JBS, has joined the PSB (Social
Party of Brazil) to increase JBS political participation in the State of Goiás and facilitate a future
application for governor. Goiás is JBS’s home state.

Boards composed of ex-politicians and former officials from state enterprises
Hillman (2005) asserts that one way to link a firm with the government is by appointing expoliticians to the board of directors. Analyzing the composition of board of directors from large
Brazilian DCMC’s in sectors such as agribusiness, construction and pulp and paper, we found the
names of career employees from BNDES, ministers and officials with experience in pension funds and
public companies. Usually, they are invited to join the board as independent advisors and get involved
with the company’s strategy. Our interviewees asserted that board members linked to the government
are considered very influential because of their know-how in dealing with public sectors. This political
strategy can also be used to complement and reinforce other strategies, since former officials have a
better understanding of public procedures and have developed personal connections with current
officials.

Industry associations
One of the main roles of an industry association is to represent and defend industry demands
within the government with greater bargaining power, since it accounts for a high level of
employability and a large slice of the country’s income. Associations get involved in activities like
discussing changes in legislations, requesting support related to foreign markets access, advocating for
preferential tax rates, double taxation agreements, price controls, customs control and procedures
related to foreign trade. Moreover, they can also act as arbitrators, mediating differences and creating
convergence within the industry, so that the industry position is cohesive before drawing the attention
of authorities responsible for public policy processes.
Companies can resort to associations as a collective political strategy. They are less expensive
and risky than individual political strategies, however benefits awarded may be distributed to all
members or even free riders. In order to obtain superior returns, firms can combine their political
strategies with market strategies. For example, firm 2 has resorted to an association as a way to speak
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with the home country government and ask it to facilitate access to the Japanese market. At the same
time it started a dialogue with potential suppliers and distributors in Japan to secure exclusivity and
create entrance barriers against other Brazilian competitors.
Associations are a place to monitor competitors and to meet goals through joint action.
Choosing the meat sector as a priority in the Policy for Productive Development, towards its
consolidation and its internationalization, indicates the strength of this industry association and the
benefits it may bring to its associates. After all, even if entrepreneurs have direct access to the
authorities through personal connections, many situations can only be heard and discussed when
articulated by industry representatives. A good example is the work conducted by the Brazilian Union
of Sugar Cane Industry (UNICA) that has signed a provisional measure in December 2011 to stimulate
ethanol storage domestically and avoid price fluctuation in harvests of sugar cane. The text of this
provisional measure provides producers with federal funding at lower interest rates than the market so
that they can build buffer stocks.

Conclusion
This study works towards a better recognition of the political aspects in DMNCs’ entry and
expansion phases in international markets. We focus on the understanding of the mechanisms
governments use to foster the internationalization process of national firms and how DMNCs have
overcome barriers to compete internationally by nurturing strong ties with home country governments.
Internationalization affects the opportunities and constraints facing social and economic actors, and
therefore their policy preferences (Milner & Keohane, 1996). We considered firms and governments
as bounded rational actors that engage in political dialogue to pursue rent-seeking or businessman selfinterests, on one side, and development goals or politicians’ and bureaucrats’ self-interests, on the
other.
Since the 1990s, an exogenous easing of international exchange have induced reforms in Brazil
towards a political economy in which private enterprise, including foreign investment, assumes
expanded responsibility for economic development (Onis, 2000). We analyzed the Brazilian
government’s role in promoting and securing OFDI during DCMCs’ first time as global players, a role
that can be compared to American, European and Japanese governments during the first and second
wave of internationalization. The policy mechanisms that enhance domestic firms’ international
insertion are not exclusive to developed or developing countries, but they can be better investigated
considering country specific variable, taking into account both demand (actors’ preferences, weighted
by their market power and their propensity for collective action) and supply side (political institutions,
politicians’ interests and prevailing ideas in a society) for public policies. Future research can also
engage in comparative analysis between home country government mechanisms from developed and
developing countries today. In fact, the US government has played a continuous role in large MNCs’
recoveries during the financial crisis.
Our goal in this work was to pay attention to the combination of mechanisms from both
Brazilian domestic and foreign policy that influence Brazilian DMNCs internationalization. Although
this study shows evidence that could easily relate to other emerging economies, any potential
generalization should take into account the specific trajectory that has led Brazil to its actual state. For
instance, the large presence of natural resources, its recent military regime, and its longer
industrialization experience (when compared to its Asian counterparts) may suggest that there are
specific mechanisms that are unique to the nation (Etzkowitz & Brisolla, 1999). However, key
similarities in industrial, trade and commercial policies including interventionism, protectionism and
the selection of niche growth areas (such as chaebols or national champions) suggests that
governments in emerging economies play a unique role in shaping the international faith of its national
competitors (Rasiah et al., 2010).
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Political institutions reflect domestic actor’s policy preferences, since they are intentionally
created to guarantee the pursuit of particular policies (Milner & Keohane, 1996). The convergence of
preferences between Brazilian political and economic actors towards an increase in their international
insertion has led to public policies that aim to benefit Brazilian MNCs and to corporate political
activity that aims to extract above-average returns from them. The case shows the relevance of
context-specific analysis in understanding MNC strategies based on an environment that differs from
most CPA literature, which has focused on two-party systems, checks and balances and regulated
lobbying. Instead, Brazil is a multi-party system with the prevalence of policy networks, defined as
systems of informal relationships between rational individuals that create a stable infrastructure for the
exchange of personal favors (Verdier, 1995).
Our findings suggest that although Brazilian companies’ decisions to internationalize are mainly
influenced by factors in the market environment, the home country political environment is a key
element of DMNCs’ strategies to access resources that drive FDI and the internationalization path of
companies. Home country governments can support companies both in entry phases and after they
have been established in foreign markets. Brazilian national champions exemplify the type of
DMNCs that have pursued political and market strategies that enable them to catch-up with
established internationals players and have access to significant incentives from the Brazilian
government, such as subsided capital, facilitated dialogue with foreign governments and favorable
competition policies.
We argue that there is an association between MNCs’ political activity and the access to higher
political benefits in the home-country political environment. Firms may perceive high returns potential
in engaging in the policymaking process, especially in priority issues for the government, such as its
global economic presence. We suggest that further research should incorporate evidence from other
develop and developing firms in order to address two additional questions; determine the extent to
which the choice, application and results from political strategies are different between developed and
developing firms; to question the historical, social and cultural traits that affect the availability of
political connections and the extent to which formal or informal ones are implemented. We would
expect future studies to incorporate quantitative information as well as to use appropriate designs in
order to isolate the causality direction of political activity.
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ANNEX A

Evidences
Evidence
“The motivation for our
international expansion came,
amongst other factors, from our
industry, which is at a favorable
moment in the country”
“As resources to help our
internationalization, JBS sought out
capital from an IPO as well as
Bandespar”

Source
Type
*Interview with the Director of the Favorable Regulation and
company A (translation produced by Legislation
authors)

*Interview with the Director of the Personal Connection
company A (translation produced by
authors)

“In the case of BNDES the bank
*Interview with the Director of the Supply of subsidized resources for
was oriented to support acquisitions company A (translation produced by internationalization
abroad”
authors)
“For our merger with Bertim &
Pilgrim´s Pride the combined
operation had a contribution from
BNDES of about US$2 billion”

*Interview with the Director of the Personal Connections : Supply of
company A (translation produced by subsidized resources for
authors)
internationalization

“Without the contribution from
*Interview with the Director of the Supply of subsidized resources for
BNDES this transaction would have company A (translation produced by internationalization
not been possible, or would have
authors)
been slower”
In terms of the Policy for Productive BNDES (2009a)
Development (PDP in Portuguese)
BNDES chose the meat sector as a
priority for the consolidation and
internationalization processes

Industry Association

BNDESPAR will provide
guarantees for a 100% of bonds
issued by JBS, exchangeable into
Brazilian Depositary Receipts of
JBS in the USA or alternatively
exchangeable into JBS shares in
case JBS USA decides not to open
its capital. This should occur by
December 31, 2010

Personal Connection: Supply of
subsidized resources for
internationalization

BNDES (2009b)

Given the fact that the IPO did not
Freitas (2011)
go through, BNDES converts all
bonds for shares in JBS Brazil, with
its participation going from 17% to
31%

Personal Connection to
Government’s shareholder
participation

JBS Board - Until August 2012:
Marcus Vinicius Pratini de Moraes
(Minister, founder of FUNCEX,
member of the Advisory Board at
BM&F, president of ABIEC); Peter
Dvorsak (BNDES, BNDESPAR);
Umberto Conti (FUNCEF, Special
Advisor to the President)

Board composed of ex-politicians
and former officials from state
enterprises

JBS (n. d.)
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Membership in associations:
Associação Brasileira das Indústrias Industry Association / Personal
ABRAFRIGO – associação
Exportadoras de Carnes (2012)
Connection
brasileira de frigoríficos; ABIEC –
associação brasileira de industries
exportadoras de carne (the President
is the director of business strategy
for JBS, Antônio Jorge Camardelli)
JBS was the largest single donor to Transparência Brasil. (2008, 2010)
Dilma’s 2010 Presidential campaign
(INTERVIEWER) “The difference
in the organizational structure of
JBS in Brazil and the US responds
to differences in the ways in which
government relations are
implemented in both countries?”
(INTERVIEWEE) “Yes, although
we know that everyone does
lobbying in Brazil”

Financial Donations to political
parties

*Interview with the Director of the Personal Connection
company A (translation produced by
authors)

Note. *company A is a fictitious name. Company A was interviewed by the authors in August, 2011.
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ANNEX B

Outward FDI Projects by State-owned TNCs, by Home Region/Economy, 2003-2010
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Developed countries

34 414

48 570

55 342

55 168

85 881

98 137

84 937

56 051

Developing countries

36 895

43 021

45 535

101 965

91 100

111 606

74 254

85 698

11 462

5 592

8 193

16 767

21 267

32 492

28 613

38 899

Malaysia

4 930

1 432

2 572

2 050

4 288

4 813

2 854

19 811

Brazil

5 344

1 085

2 391

1 740

2 501

9 592

2 381

5 808

United Arab Emirates

447

258

17 520

45 516

27 108

28 297

20 470

5 713

Korea, Republic of

904

1 444

2 055

86

1 095

2 800

4 353

3 734

South Africa

2 135

15 352

1 174

446

1 358

2 166

2 323

2 225

Singapore

2 196

4 609

2 689

6 309

6 574

2 724

1 191

1 739

Kuwait

1 023

1 346

735

10 071

4 109

4 501

286

1 263

Colombia

-

-

-

536

340

-

-

1 197

Qatar

-

264

236

53

5 265

5 331

4 943

1 063

2 257

48

171

897

627

1 501

374

780

Bahrain

5

2

2

415

162

422

28

745

Angola

-

-

-

-

24

-

-

493

2 842

6 002

3 654

13 905

1 096

4 529

5 174

487

146

5 071

178

1 733

12 831

7 309

58

473

China

Venezuela

India
Saudi Arabia

Note. The data include major SOE investors. FDI projects include both cross-border M&As and greenfield FDI projects.
Countries associated with indirect investments by third-parties have been removed. Source: United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development. (2011). World investment report 2011. Non-equity modes of international production and
development (pp. 2-16). Retrieved from http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf; United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development. (2012). World investment report 2012. Towards a new generation of investment
policies (pp. 2-16). Retrieved from http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf
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